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Now that a new period of international uncer-
tainty and flux is upon us, with talk of the need
for a new international order, a number of
familiar questions are posed with a new force.
Why does the United Nations not play the role of
pioneering new international solutions to world
problems? Why does it not by now speak with the
authority based on self-confidence, expertise and
recognized high quality of its work, which the
founders of the organization hoped for when they
drafted the Charter? Why is this true of the UN,
whether considered as a governmental organiza-
tion and also, more specifically, in relation to the
role of the Secretary-General and the UN staff?
Why is it that even in relationship to other parts of
the UN system, especially to the World Bank, the
IMF and some of the major agencies the leader-
ship seems claarly to have passed out of the
hands of the UN itself?
Shirley Hazzard explores these questions con-
centrting almost entirely on the role of the
Secretary-General and especially that of the UN
Secretariat, She explains that its diminished role,
its timidity and ineffectiveness, are largely a
result of the McCarthy troubles of, say, 1949 to
1954, when the Secretariat's spirit was destroyed
by the attack from the McCarthyites outside com-
bined with betrayal by a weak and unprincipled
Secretary-General and senior administration
officials inside.
Nobody who lived through those years in the
Secretariat will deny that there is a great deal
of truth in this. Even those who survived, and
possibly benefited from, the fate which over-
took some of their colleagues, will agree with
this in their inner hearts, though they might not
wish to place themselves on record. The first
Secretary-General, Trygve Lie and his American
kitchen cabinet were a disaster. Dag Ham-
marskjöld's arrival was a turning pointShirley
Hazzard somewhat underrates how momentous
this was. In her analysis of Hammarskjöld, per-
ceptive though it is, she shows a failure to appre-
ciate him fully. Her comments on him are often
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based on notes from Brian Urquhart, whose book
on Hammarskjöld has since become available and
gives a fuller and better-balanced picture of the
man.
But by and large, one must agree with Shirley
Hazzard. The Secretariat has never really re-
covered from the blows of those days. The bridge
between the Administration and the '38th Floor'
on the one hand, and the bulk of the Secretariat
on the other, has never been rebuilt. The US
Security Clearance system is still operating to the
present day and undermining the status of US
staff members in the eyes of their colleagues from
other countries. Perhaps the US Administration
will one day realize how this prejudices their
own position. Admittedly, the Soviet bloc coun-
tries do the same and in addition rotate their
staff members rapidly, but that is hardly an argu-
ment to be happily used by the country which
should be the main pillar of the UN.
One must also agree fully with what Shirley
Hazzard says about the absurd distinctions be-
tween different levels and grades of service within
the Secretariat, the lack of training facilities for
yqunger people, the lack of fair promotion and
career prospects, etc. However, there is one point
on which I have reservations. She is dead set
against the principle of geographical represen-
tation which she denounces sharply, again and
again. Here, I believe she is barking up the wrong
tree. The principle of geographical representation
is right. It is right that the Secretariat should
reflect the traditions, experiences, instincts and
outlook of the many member countries, and the
best way to assure this is a fairly balanced com-
position. But what has happened is that only too
often the other essential requirements, of com-
petence, experience and integrity, have been sacri-
ficed to government nomination. It is by no means
only the Secretariat members from under-
represented countries or regions which have been
improperly recruited, although this may have
been particularly flagrant and obvious. It is the
absence of proper selection which Shirley Haz-
zard should attack and not the principle of geo-
graphical representation.
In fact, there is an inconsistency in her reasoning
on this point, since on the one hand she empha-
sizes the demoralization, loss of better-quality
staff, timidity, etc. etc. of the (mainly Western)
survivors of the McCarthy era, whilst on the other
hand taking it for granted that those selected
on 'geographical' grounds are less competent.
The only real argument against geographical
representation is that people of the required
competence and experience in many of the under-
represented countries are particulary scarce and
that their work in their own countries is more
important than their work in the UN could be.
This argument, however, Shirley Hazzard is
presumably too much of an internationalist to use.
Anybody reading Shirley Hazzard's passionate and
essentially true denunciation of Trygve Lie and
those around him cannot fail to be struck by the
analogy with Watergateeven down to the
dispensation of 'hush money' in the form of
generous indemnities for those staff members who
were willing to knuckle under and go quietly
away.
In the last resort, of course, Shirley Hazzard
cannot prove her point since it is essentially
incapable of proof (or disproof, either). Nobody
can be quite certain what would have happened
in the UN Secretariat in the absence of the
McCarthy disaster. Perhaps similar problems
would have erupted from a different cause. Staff
weaknesses are not exactly unknown in many
other organizations unaffected by McCarthyism.
However, to me Shirley Hazzard seems plausible,
although perhaps in a slightly more complex
sense than she may realize. The decline in the
status and authority of the Secretariat due to the
McCarthyite troubles started a vicious circle. As
the machine weakened there was an increasing
tendency to bypass itboth on the part of govern-
ments and of world opinion, and even from the
inside on the part of the Secretary-General
himself, as was clearly the case in the days of
Dag Hammarskjöld. And as the machine was not
being used it consequently further declined in
status, in its power to attract high-calibre people,
and in experience of the real world, thus limiting
the Secretariat to an unreal paper world which
was then invested, especially by means of an
uncontrollable and pyramiding documentation,
with the Orwellian attributes of a new reality.
Shirley Hazzard writes beautifully. She can well
afford to be contemptuous of the style and colour-
lessness of all too many UN documents. But here
again I would have some reservations. UN
documents are not meant to engage the passions
of the reader. They are meant to list arguments
pro and con; it is often a legitimate function of
a Secretariat document to 'take the steam out of
the argument'. But where Shirley Hazzard is
right is that too often the argument is taken out
with the steam, and that the Secretariat may be
forgetting its other function, equally essential
although perhaps less frequent where its proper
role should be to put the steam back into an
argument, to stir things up where an important
discussion or decision is in danger of being lost
in formalistic or legalistic detail.
Shirley Hazzard somewhat grudgingly acknowl-
edges that the UN seems now ready to respond to
serious criticism in a more adult manner than
before. Sir Robert Jackson was not nailed to the
cross for his capacity study (although I happen
to believe that he drew fundamentally wrong
conclusions from his fundamentally correct com-
ments on Secretariat capacity). The author could
have been a little more generous in acknowledging
that there were and are a number of people within
the Secretariat who tried, and sometimes tried
desperately, to maintain standards and to fulfil the
Secretariat function of pioneering new and pro-
gressive ideas. The Secretariat is not quite such a
non-differentiated morass of futility as many of
Shirley Hazzard's readers must conclude.
And now once again there is much talk of a
'New International Order'as there was under
more favourable auspices in 1945-47. A New
International Order will require strengthened and
improved international institutionsnot least a
strengthened and improved United Nations staff.
This is where the lessons of the past drawn in
Shirley Hazzard's book become important for the
future.
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